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Abstract 
Michael Smith’s Internalist resolution to “The Moral Problem” serves to 
establish a necessary connection between moral judgement and moral 
motivation in the rational agent. Externalists, like Brink, counter Smith’s 
claim with the figure of the Amoralist, whose moral motivation, they 
argue, is only contingent on antecedently-held desires. In this paper, I draw 
a distinction between “moral motivation” – if an agent judges it right to 
Φ, she is, ceteris paribus, motivated to Φ - and “acting on moral motivation” 
– if an agent judges it right to Φ, she actually Φs. I show how the Amoralist 
explanation might account for the latter, but not the former, which 
ultimately leaves Smith’s argument for motivational Internalism intact.  
 
 
 
The central organizing question in the field of Metaethics, as contended by Michael Smith, 
pertains to the apparent incompatibility between the oft-presupposed objectivity and 
practicality platitudes of moral judgements. In his book, The Moral Problem, Smith aims to 
overcome the incompatibility by arguing that moral judgements entail normative reasons for 
action, which are, by their very nature, both objective and motivating1. His solution has since 
been challenged by many Externalists including David Brink; Brink posits the figure of the 
Amoralist, a rational being who makes moral judgements, but fails to be motivated by them. 
In this paper, I aim to show that Brink’s account of moral motivation does not ultimately 
challenge the validity of Michael Smith’s solution to the Moral Problem. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the first section, I give a brief overview of Smith’s 
formulation of the Moral Problem, and follow that with an overview of his proposed solution 
in the second section. In the third section, I recapitulate Brink’s challenge to Smith’s solution. 
In the fourth section, I show how Brink’s argument does not invalidate Smith’s solution. I 
reformulate the conclusion of Smith’s argument in such a way as to make its salience against 
Brink’s criticism apparent. The fifth section concludes.  
 
                                                          
1 Belief about the rightness of Φ entails a normative reason to Φ, which causes the desire to Φ, which in 
turn, motivates the agent to act in accordance with the belief. 
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1. The Moral Problem: An Introduction  
 
The moral problem is constituted by three propositions about morality that are individually 
plausible, but jointly inconsistent. The problem, as formulated by Smith, is as follows: 
 
1. Moral judgements of the type, “It is right that I Φ” express a subject’s beliefs 
about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do. 
 
2. If one judges it right that she Φs, then ceteris paribus, she is motivated to Φ. 
 
3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate 
desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's terms, 
distinct existences. (Smith, 1994) 
 
It is worth explicating exactly wherein the inconsistency arises. In general, traditional views 
of moral judgements presuppose both objectivity and practicality – what Smith has referred 
to as “moral platitudes.” (Smith, 1994) The first proposition is Smith’s “objectivity thesis.” 
Were this true, moral judgements would have to be beliefs, since only beliefs are truth-apt 
and representational of moral facts. Beliefs, however, are not unto themselves practically 
motivating. The second proposition is Smith’s “practicality requirement.” If this were true, 
moral judgements would have to be expressions of desire, since only desires are motivating. 
The downside is that desires are neither objective and truth-apt, nor rationally criticisable. So 
far, we can see that if moral judgements are to be both objective and practical, they must be 
both beliefs and desires. However, the long-standing Humean view of moral motivation states 
that beliefs and desires are distinct entities and additionally that a moral judgement is sufficient 
to explain action only if it is supplemented with a relevant desire to realize that judgement. 
Our traditional view of moral judgements is, thus, inconsistent. 
 
1.1 Strategies for Overcoming the Inconsistency 
 
If we espouse the Humean view of belief-desire psychology, then moral judgements cannot 
be objective and practical simultaneously. A natural strategy to overcome the inconsistency 
lies in rejecting one of the three propositions. If we reject the objectivity thesis, we adopt the 
non-cognitivist perspective, under which, we can neither account for the seemingly 
descriptive nature of moral discourse, nor allow for the platitude of moral disagreement. By 
denying that moral judgements are beliefs, we concede that morality is entirely contingent on 
the agent’s desires and thereby, reduce moral discourse to the goal of convincing others to 
adopt our desires. If we reject the practicality requirement, we are unable to explain how and 
why moral motivation “tracks” the agent’s beliefs about what is right. Beliefs, given their 
mind-to-world direction of fit, are not action-guiding. And yet, when we change our beliefs 
about what is morally permitted or prohibited, we find ourselves eager to comply with these 
new beliefs. How, then, can we account for this? Lastly, if we reject the Humean picture, we 
can neither “account for our actions as goal-directed, nor explain our actions as fundamentally 
teleological (Copp, 1997).” We lose much of morality’s substantive characteristics by rejecting 
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one of the three conflicting propositions. Therefore, Smith concludes, we should overcome 
the inconsistency while retaining all the propositions.  
 
2. Normative Reasons: Smith’s Solution to The Moral Problem  
 
Smith’s solution to the problem is a form of moral rationalism wherein the right thing for an 
agent to do is the thing she would do were she fully rational. Smith sides with cognitivists in 
accepting the objectivity thesis presented above. That is to say that when an agent makes a 
moral judgement of the kind, “It is right to Φ in C,” she indeed expresses truth-apt beliefs 
about objective moral facts. Smith also accepts the practicality requirement, but makes a 
distinction between explanatory and normative reasons for action. Explanatory reasons are 
psychological states that link beliefs to action only when paired with a pre-existing desire to 
act. Normative reasons, on the other hand, apply to all moral judgements and are such that 
the belief itself entails a desire to act (note that beliefs and desires are distinct entities here). 
When an agent says, “It is right to Φ in C,” she has a normative reason to Φ in C (Smith, 
1997).2 
 
Smith defends the claim that these normative reasons are both objective and practical. They 
are objective in that, when arrived at through a process of rational reflection and argument, 
they prescribe a common course of action for all people in the same moral situation. Here, 
the process of “rational reflection” consists of considering what the agent’s fully rational 
counterpart would want her to do in situation C. Said another way, then, the agent’s belief 
that “It is right to Φ in C,” is tantamount to saying the agent’s fully ideal counterpart would 
want her to Φ in C. This connection to the agent’s fully rational self explains the practicality 
of normative reasons. Smith argues that if an agent’s fully rational counterpart wants her to 
Φ in C, the agent is then motivated to Φ in C (Smith, 1994). In short, if an agent judges it 
right to Φ in C – i.e. possesses a normative reason to Φ in C because her fully rational self 
wants her to Φ in C – then she is motivated to Φ in C. The upshot of this argument, and the 
conclusion at which Brink’s criticism is directed, is that if an agent judges it right to Φ in C, 
and fails to be motivated to Φ in C, her belief-desire set is incoherent and she is practically 
irrational “by her own lights.” (Smith, 1994)  
 
In essence, Smith’s argument commits him to the Internalist camp, which holds that there is 
a necessary connection between moral judgement and moral motivation in the “good and 
strong-willed person” (Smith, 1994). The motivation to act in accordance with one’s moral 
beliefs is internal or intrinsic to the belief itself. It is not contingent upon further considerations 
like the agent’s fundamental proclivity to be moral or wish to be rational. Of course, to remain 
compatible with Humean psychology, Smith does allow that a person who judges it right to 
Φ in C, may fail to actually Φ in C (Smith, 1994). Nevertheless, the connection between 
judgement and motivation is mandatory in the rational person – i.e. it is impossible for a fully 
rational person to make a genuine moral judgement without being moved to motivation by 
it. For if this is not so, the agent fails to have a desire that she herself believes is rational to 
have, which by Smith’s view, is practically irrational.  
                                                          
2 Rightness of Φ in C ↔ Normative reason to Φ in C → Motivation to Φ in C → Agent Φs in C 
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3. The Amoralist: An Externalist Challenge to Smith’s Solution 
 
Smith’s conception of rationality has drawn much criticism from Externalists like David 
Brink, who counter with the archetype of the Amoralist, “the rational, strong willed individual 
who seemingly makes moral judgments, while remaining utterly indifferent” (Rosati, 2014). 
Brink argues that there is no obvious irrationality in failing to be motivated by the moral 
judgements one makes, because in many cases, moral reasons bear no rational authority.  
 
By “moral reasons,” Brink means, “impartial other-regarding obligations that do not apply to 
agents in virtue of their aims or interests.” “Rational authority” refers to the prescriptions of 
an “agent-centered conception of practical reason that rests on instrumental or prudential” 
concerns (Brink, 1997). Put differently, in many cases, the dictates of an impartial morality 
diverge from the ends of individual interest and make it so that fulfilling one’s moral 
requirements does not advance one’s interests. If we accept that rational action is action that 
advances the agent’s interests, as Brink thinks we should, in such cases at least, moral 
judgements have no rational authority. Relaying Brink’s argument in Smith’s terms, we see 
that in such cases, it would not be irrational to judge it right to Φ in C and fail to be motivated 
to Φ in C.3 This is especially true, Brink posits, because Smith provides no reason to favour 
moral or normative reasons over instrumental or prudential reasons in one’s judgement-
making and decision-making processes.  
 
Brink’s argument, if viable, challenges Smith’s idea of normative reasons and the necessary 
and intrinsic connection between moral judgement and moral motivation they stipulate 
(Externalism, by definition). It shows, instead, that any moral motivation is contingently derived 
from an antecedently-held deeper desire of the agent’s.    
 
4. Defeasibility of Moral Motivation: A Defence of Smith’s Solution  
 
The upshot of Brink’s challenge is that we must deny the original practicality platitude from 
our explanation of moral judgements. As discussed previously, however, rejecting this 
proposition is troublesome because it leaves us unable to explain how and why moral 
motivation so reliably “tracks” the agent’s beliefs about what is right.4 Fortunately, we need 
not reject the practicality requirement, since Smith’s argument stands salient against Brink’s 
criticism. In this section, I will defend Smith’s solution against the Amoralist argument by 
citing the defeasibility of moral action. I will also introduce the notion of “moral irrationality” 
to bridge the gap, as identified by Brink, between instrumental and moral reasons. 
 
                                                          
3 Rightness of Φ in C ↔ Normative reason to Φ in C → Instrumental reasons > Normative reason → 
Agent not motivated to Φ in C  
4 In Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation (1998), Shafer-Landau makes an Externalist argument for how an 
underlying desire to be moral, de dicto, can still account for this “tracking,” but Smith considers and rejects 
it as a form of moral fetishism. The scope of this paper prevents me from covering that vein of argument 
here. 
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Recall that the crux of Brink’s argument lay in the claim that in cases where moral and practical 
reasons for action conflict, it might be rational to judge it right to Φ and fail to be motivated 
to Φ. Brink claims that this explains why moral judgement cannot be intrinsically motivating. 
I challenge this claim by making a distinction between “moral motivation” and “acting upon 
moral motivation.” In Brink’s case, when he says that moral motivation is contingent upon 
antecendently-held instrumental desires, I contest that what he actually means is that the 
agent’s acting on moral motivation is contingent upon antecendently-held instrumental desires.  
 
Per my view, moral motivation is not contingent – i.e. it occurs intrinsically once an agent 
judges it right to Φ and discovers a normative reason to Φ. The action (derived from the motivation), 
however, is contingent upon the agent’s goals and interests – and it is this contingency to 
which Brink’s challenge refers.5 Understood in this sense, we see how Brink’s argument might 
account for why the agent refrains from ultimately acting upon her moral judgement (cases in 
which other-regarding moral requirements do not advance the agent’s interests), but does not 
disprove Smith’s claim that the moral judgement is necessarily motivating. I argue that all 
moral agents will be pro tanto motivated to Φ, at least marginally, after forming a belief about 
the rightness of Φ. However, not all moral agents – chief amongst them, Amoralists – will 
act upon that motivation; only those agents whose instrumental reasons do not override their 
moral reasons will be moved to action.6  
 
Strong Moral Motivation: Brink attacks Strong Moral Motivation, which 
mandates a necessary connection between moral judgement and action.  
 
Agent judges it right to Φ → Agent necessarily Φs 
 
Weak Moral Motivation: Smith, however, defends only a weakened form of 
moral motivation, which mandates a necessary connection between moral 
judgement and moral motivation 
 
Agent judges it right to Φ → Agent is necessarily motivated to Φ → Agent may 
or may not Φ 
 
Brink’s connection between moral judgement and moral action, is stronger than Smith’s 
original proposition. Smith defends the connection between moral judgement and moral 
motivation, but allows for defeasibility between moral motivation and moral action. Per 
Smith, if someone judges it right that she Φs, then ceteris paribus, she is motivated to Φ. This 
formulation necessitates a connection between judgement and motivation, but allows that an 
agent may fail to act on her motivation due to “weakness of will [and] other such psychological 
failures.” (Smith, 1994) Since Brink attacks a stronger version of Smith’s solution than Smith 
himself presents, his challenge can be overcome if we just consider the difference between 
                                                          
5 Rightness of Φ in C ↔ Normative reason to Φ in C → Agent motivated to Φ in C → Instrumental 
reasons > Normative reason → Agent does not Φ in C  
6 Rightness of Φ in C ↔ Normative reason to Φ in C → Agent motivated to Φ in C → Instrumental 
reasons < Normative reason → Agent Φs in C  
6 
 
being motivated to Φ (moral motivation) and acting upon one’s motivation to Φ (moral 
action).   
 
Given that there is a substantive difference between being motivated to Φ and actually Φing, 
Externalists, like Brink, urge a redefinition of Smith’s conception of irrationality. They argue 
that when moral and instrumental reasons for action conflict, Smith provides no reason to 
favour moral reasons over instrumental reasons. He, instead, presupposes that we should 
prefer moral reasons, lest we become irrational. At this juncture, Externalists assert a 
distinction between weak and strong irrationality, where weak irrationality entails acting 
contradictory to a reason for action and strong irrationality entails acting contradictory to the 
best reason for action (Shafer-Landau, 1999). Brink’s claim follows: since the instrumental 
reason for action is the best reason, it should not be “strong irrational” to favour it over the 
moral reason. I think that Smith would be happy to concede that point (as he has already 
allowed for defeasibility of moral action). I argue, however, that moral considerations should 
not be relegated to the realm of “weak irrationality,” since morality is an important common 
concern. Therefore, we should introduce the notion of “moral irrationality,” which entails 
acting against one’s most compelling moral reason, but in compliance with one’s most 
compelling practical reason. In this way, if an agent judges it right to Φ, but fails to actually 
Φ, she might be rational in a strong sense, but will be irrational in a moral sense.  
 
Smith’s Original Irrationality Proposition: 
Agent judges it 
right to Φ, but 
fails to actually Φ 
(assuming the 
instrumental 
reason overrides 
the moral reason)  
 
Agent’s action 
complies with best 
practical reason 
Agent’s action goes 
against best practical 
reason 
Agent’s action 
complies with best 
moral reason 
Rationality Rationality 
Agent’s action goes 
against best moral 
reason 
Irrationality 
(Brink’s challenge) 
Irrationality 
 
Amended Irrationality Proposition: 
Agent judges it 
right to Φ, but 
fails to actually Φ 
(assuming the 
instrumental 
reason overrides 
the moral reason) 
 
Agent’s action 
complies with best 
practical reason 
Agent’s action goes 
against best practical 
reason 
Agent’s action 
complies with best 
moral reason 
Moral Rationality  
(Strong Rationality) 
Moral Rationality 
(Strong Irrationality) 
Agent’s action goes 
against best moral 
reason 
Moral Irrationality 
(Strong Rationality) 
Moral Irrationality 
(Strong Irrationality) 
 
The notion would alter Smith’s conclusion so as to have it read: if an agent judges it right to 
Φ in C, and fails to actually Φ in C, her belief-desire set is incoherent and she is morally 
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irrational.7 This restatement trumps the Amoralist challenge by allowing for cases in which 
practical reasons can override moral reasons (defeasibility of moral action), but retains Smith’s 
Internalist assertion that moral judgements are necessarily motivating.    
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have endeavoured to show that Brink’s Externalist attack against Smith’s 
solution to the Moral Problem is invalid. Brink attacks a stronger version of Smith’s solution 
than Smith himself advocates. We can overcome Brink’s challenge by acknowledging that 
Smith allows for defeasibility between moral judgement and action, but not between moral 
judgement and motivation. Having conceded that point, we can bolster Smith’s position by 
introducing the notion of “moral irrationality,” which is the state of acting against one’s best 
moral reason for action. This restatement of Smith’s conclusion accommodates the Amoralist 
challenge while retaining the intrinsic nature of moral motivation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Originally: if an agent judges it right to Φ in C, and fails to actually Φ in C, her belief-desire set is 
incoherent and she is practically irrational 
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